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INTRODUCTION
The chapter of authoritarian rule may finally be ending
in Burma’s1 complicated narrative. The Burmese government
has taken visible steps towards democratic reform. Despite
reports of military control and intimidation at the polls,2 the
country transitioned to civilian rule in 20103 after fifty years
of control by a military junta. The government also released
the country’s preeminent democratic leader and icon, Aung
San Suu Kyi,4 who has been on house arrest sporadically
since 1989.5 Rapid political reforms soon followed.6
The ability to reconcile Burma’s political history and
transition to a democracy will be a challenging one. A
successful transformation requires more than legal
formalism; legal formalism cannot work without the
development of a civil society. However, legal formalism, as
Suu Kyi has urged,7 ensures a rule of law that will allow
Burmese citizens, including minority groups, to protect
themselves from their government’s historical abuse of power.
This Comment discusses how the expansion of legal rights for
individuals and minorities is the direct way for Burma to
secure a democratic future.

1. The official name is the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. See
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN. (2008) (HeinOnline,
current) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST.]. As a personal preference, I will use
“Burma.” See Should it be Burma or Myanmar?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7013943.stm (last updated Sept. 26, 2007, 12:21 PM).
2. See Myanmar Votes in Election Controlled by Military, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/world/asia/07myanmar.html?_r=0.
3. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Junta Members Go Civilian, N.Y. TIMES (May
1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/world/asia/02myanmar.html.
4. Myanmar Dissident Calls for Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/world/asia/15myanmar.html.
See also
Kathleen Hennessey & Danielle Ryan, Aung San Suu Kyi Receives
TIMES
(Sept.
19,
2012),
Congressional
Gold
Medal,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/19/world/la-fg-suu-kyi-obama-20120920
(reporting on the democratic leader’s recent acceptance of Congress’ highest
honor).
5. The Nobel Peace Prize 1991: Aung San Suu Kyi, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/kyi-bio.html (last
updated Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter NOBEL PRIZE].
6. See Thomas Fuller, For a Changing Myanmar, the Real Tests Lie Ahead,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/world/asia/fora-changing-myanmar-the-real-challenges-lie-ahead.html.
7. AUNG SAN SUU KYI, In Quest of Democracy, in FREEDOM FROM FEAR
AND OTHER WRITINGS 167, 168 (Michael Aris ed., 1991) (advocating
“representative government, human rights and the rule of law”).
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Part I provides a foundation to understand the recent
changes: it summarizes Burma’s political development
history, the Asian values theory, and the right-todevelopment argument. The historical section examines four
periods: 1) precolonial and colonial Burma; 2) the attempt at
democracy following independence; 3) the military-socialist
takeover; and 4) the current period following the 1988
democratic movements.
This background validates the
significance of Burma’s recent reforms and emphasizes the
challenges that Burma must tackle moving forward.
The section then goes on to discuss the Asian values
theory, which is based on a claimed existence of a pan-Asian
emphasis of communitarianism8 over individualism that
purportedly accounts for the differences between Western and
Asian standards of governance. The reevaluation of this
cultural argument is particularly important to Burma
because of the country’s infamous human rights record and
its apparent desire to correct that.
Another critical theory supported by many Asian nations
is the right-to-development argument. This is premised on
the idea that economic development is a prerequisite to
political development. Any expansion of political liberties
must be subordinate to economic growth. Like the Asian
values discourse, many states have also used this argument
to defend their human rights abuses.
Part II considers the merits and flaws of the Asian
human rights discourse. It is useful to retrace the praises
and criticisms that confronted the development phases of
Burma’s Asian neighbors, particularly the relationship
between human rights and economic modernization. This
section unearths the Asian values debate, examining whether
there is an Asian type of democracy. It goes on to question
whether the low development of political rights is excusable
because, as the argument goes, the priority appropriately
remains with economic development.

8. I believe that “communitarianism” is a term of art to provide a
comparison with the more Western notion of individualism. In this Comment’s
context, communitarianism is generally the belief that the individual is
subordinate to the community, often resulting in less individual rights, rights
that a Western political thinker may believe to be more valuable. Elements of
communitarianism will be discussed throughout the Comment.
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Part III applies the arguments discussed in Part II to
Burma and assesses Burma’s potential to establish a
democratic future and a safe haven for individual rights.
While some economic principles will be addressed, this
Comment’s overall scope is limited to the political and legal
assessment of Burma’s future. Accordingly, this section will
also explore Suu Kyi’s influence on her people and her
government.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Burma’s Political Development History
Political scientist Lucian Pye once wrote that “[i]f Burma
does not succeed in developing a modern economic, political,
and social structure, it will be a failure of human effort, a
matter of social and cultural variables, a case of
organizational and ideological inadequacy.”9 So far, this
appears to be the case. For most of its existence, Burma has
been limited to extreme forms of government—from absolute
monarchy, to colonialism, to militarized socialism. Suspicion
of those in power is the norm in Burmese society.10
Historically, this has led people to trust only close
associations like tribes and clans.11 Any reliance on broader
government and political institutions, if any that exists
currently, is a recent development in Burma.
1. Precolonial and Colonial Burma: Approximately
1075–1948
Before Burma was made a British province in 1824,12 the
Burmese lived under an absolute monarchy where the king
ruled with unchecked power.13 Even the royal council lived in
9. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, The Cultural Dimensions of
Authority 100 (1985).
10. See Stephen McCarthy, The Political Theory of Tyranny in Singapore
and Burma 196 (2006).
11. Id. at 127. Pye also notes that “[i]n Southeast Asia the politics of
entourages and cliques, of personal networks and associations, are critical for
the building of coherent national power structures.” Pye, supra note 9, at 127.
12. U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, East & Southeast Asia: Burma, THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/bm.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012).
13. See Myint Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: No March Backwards
Towards the Past, 1 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 5, 6 (2000) (writing that
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fear of being thrown into jail for displeasing the king.14 The
source of the king’s power arose from Buddhist beliefs, which
provided limitations and taught kings to maintain order and
justice.15 Legally, however, there were no controls on the
king’s power and such religious limitations were often
ignored.16 During this time, the administration of justice was
“marked by a high degree of personalized behaviour, with
little procedure other than prevailing notions of status and
etiquette.”17
The British introduced the Burmese to the rule of law.18
During the monarchy period, law and custom had little
The British imported foundational legal
distinction.19
principles such as contract, property, trusts, sale of goods, the
penal code, and criminal procedure.20 The British also
established a court system, yet the courts worked mainly to
the advantage of colonial administrators.21 There was a
mixed reaction to the British rule of law. To some, the system
instilled new confidence in the government by providing
equality and uniformity.22 To others, the prevalence of form
and technicality produced a system that worked without
sympathy and soul.23
2. A Brief Experiment with Democracy: 1948–1962
After achieving independence, the Burmese established a
multiparty, parliamentary democracy,24 marking Burma’s
greatest period of judicial independence and protection for
individual rights.25 Provincial elections established a 111member assembly that drafted Burma’s first constitution in

“governance of Burmese King was generally autocratic”).
14. See PYE, supra note 9, at 98.
15. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 140.
16. See Zan, supra note 13, at 5.
17. ROBERT H. TAYLOR, THE STATE IN BURMA 53 (1987).
18. MYINT ZAN, Law and Legal Culture, and Constitutions and
Constitutionalism in Burma, in EAST ASIA—HUMAN RIGHTS, NATION-BUILDING,
TRADE 180, 196 (Alice Tay ed., 1993).
19. Id. at 190.
20. Id. at 200.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 197.
23. Id.
24. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 123–24.
25. See Zan, supra note 13, at 16.
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1947.26 While there was considerable British influence,27 the
1947 Constitution also adopted the French and American
notions of an elected president, a bicameral parliament,
fundamental rights, and the principle of popular
sovereignty.28 At the same time, the constitution was also
founded on a type of democratic socialism where “people
work[ed] together to the best of their power and ability to
strive to convert the natural resources and produce of the
land, both above and below ground, into consumer
commodities to which everybody would be entitled according
to his need.”29
The Burmese Supreme Court was able to exert influence
during this period. In addition to having the authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto, and certiorari,30 the court issued notable decisions,
indicating a wide degree of protection for citizens. For
example, the court held that the distribution of communist
party propaganda leaflets did not constitute the basis of
preventive detention.31 The court also invalidated rubberstamping detention orders and limited the delegation of
preventive detention to certain officers.32 Even the executive
branch came under scrutiny when the court struck down a
number of executive actions and declared a particular
presidential action to be ultra vires (“beyond the powers”).33
3. Military-Run, Postcolonial Period: 1962–1988
By the late 1950s, Burma spiraled into political
mismanagement.34 Power was too centralized and minoritydominated states became resistant to the central
government.35 The government perceived such resistance a
26. ZAN, supra note 18, at 201.
27. See Zan, supra note 13, at 10.
28. ZAN, supra note 18, at 203.
29. Id. at 203–04. For example, constitutional provisions qualified private
property ownership “within limits which conformed to the public interest and
which prohibited monopolies and price dictation.” Id. at 205.
30. Id. at 216.
31. Zan, supra note 13, at 13.
32. Id. at 14–15.
33. Id. at 15.
34. See David C. Williams, Constitutionalism before Constitutions: Burma’s
Struggle to Build a New Order, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (2009).
35. See id. at 1665 (“[E]very major ethnic group would field a significant
resistance force.”).
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serious risk to national unity.36 The 1947 Constitution
provided any Burmese state the right to secession,37 and
though no state actually exercised its right, a military coup
nonetheless responded to the perceived threat and replaced
the government in 1962.38 This marked the end to democracy
in Burma for at least the next fifty years.
From 1962 to 2010, a military junta ruled Burma in a
one-party, socialist system. The Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSSP), adopting socialist elements from the Soviet
Union,39 dissolved parliament and established the
Revolutionary Council under its control.40 Lasting until
1988,41 the “People’s Judicial System” replaced all previous
professional judges.42 The new judges were all appointed by
BSSP and ninety percent of them had no legal
Though never formally abolished, the
qualifications.43
practice of issuing writs ended with the dissolution of the
Supreme Court and the High Court of Burma, which had
served as the guardian of the 1947 Constitution.44
The new constitution of 1974 was an effort to be “more in
harmony with Burma.”45 Through this new constitution, a
monolithic power structure emerged.46 Single-party elections,
in which voters either checked for or against a single BSSP
candidate,47 created the People’s Assembly, the country’s
highest legal authority.48 From among its ranks, the People’s
Assembly elected lower coordinate councils, the president, the
36. ZAN, supra note 18, at 219 (“General Ne Win claimed that ‘if we [the
Army] did not intervene [in March 1962], the country, if it did not split into
many parts, would certainly have split into two.’ ” ).
37. CONST. OF THE UNION OF BURMA, ch. 10, § 201 (HeinOnline, current)
[hereinafter 1947 CONST.] (“[E]very state shall have the right to secede from the
Union in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed.”).
38. ZAN, supra note 18, at 218–19.
39. Id. at 217.
40. Id. at 219–20 (Revolutionary Council as the law-making body).
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id. at 232.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 227.
45. Id. at 236. David Steinberg noted that the 1974 Constitution drew
heavily from Eastern European legal models (i.e., constitutions of Poland, East
Germany, and Romania). Id. at 240. Williams wrote that the constitution
resembled the Yugoslavian constitution. Williams, supra note 34, at 1665.
46. ZAN, supra note 18, at 239.
47. Id. at 238 (“Virtually all of the single representatives to the unicameral
Pyithu Hluttaw were elected on the first ballot.”).
48. Id. at 239.
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prime minister, and the judges.49
Though the coup occurred with no initial resistance,50 the
new government soon faced opposition and responded to it in
a brutal fashion for decades to come.51 As early as two
months after the takeover, the army fired bullets at students
who protested the new government’s assumption of power
and policies against student activism.52 Thousands of arrests
and “protective custodies” (detention without charge and
trial) followed during the ensuing period.53 The absence of
individual protection and recurring government brutality
became the norm.
4. Impetus for Change, Stalemate, and Renewed Hope:
1988–2011
In 1988, a wave of unprecedented protests swept Burma,
reacting to twenty-six years of military tyranny.54 In the
same year, Suu Kyi founded the National League for
Democracy (NLD).55 In 1989, Suu Kyi was put on house
arrest56 following her participation in the antigovernment
protests and her frequent and outright criticism of the
military leadership.57 In response to these demonstrations,
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),58
replacing the BSSP, nullified the 1974 Constitution and
promised to hold a multiparty election in 1990.59
The election resulted in an overwhelming loss by SLORC
to the NLD.60 The parties competed for 492 seats based on
geographical distribution in the election;61 however, the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 220.
51. See generally John Arendshorst, The Dilemma of Non-Interference:
Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
102 (2009).
52. ZAN, supra note 18, at 220.
53. Id. at 228.
54. Id. at 251.
55. Id. at 255.
56. Id. at 256.
57. See NOBEL PRIZE, supra note 5.
58. Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 103.
59. ZAN, supra note 18, at 254.
60. See id. at 257 (Seventy-three percent of the eligible voted; twenty-five
percent of the ballots were declared to be “invalid” or “informal ballots;” the
NLD grabbed sixty percent of the votes while twenty-five percent had voted for
the NUP). The NUP, the National Unity Party, was formerly BSSP. Id. at 254.
61. Id. at 256.

NG FINAL

2013

6/24/2013 8:02 PM

BURMA AND THE ROAD FORWARD

275

winners were not immediately put in power. SLORC refused
to grant the NLD their new legislative seats until after a new
SLORC-approved constitution was drafted.62
Reformers soon realized that the SLORC-imposed
constituent assembly was a means for SLORC to retain
control. Drafters were unable to speak or discuss freely.63 As
a result, many pro-democratic members walked out.64 Many
members were also arrested for disobeying SLORC policies.65
Because the government continued to restrict open dialogue,
the NLD boycotted and members were expelled from followup constitutional conventions in 1995 and in 2004.66
In 2008, a new constitution was drafted and approved.67
The State Peace and Development Council (SLORC was
renamed in 1997)68 handpicked the drafters who
constitutionalized a military presence in the government.69
That May, a year after the government’s bloody suppression
of a Buddhist-led movement,70 a majority referendum
approved the draft,71 and the new constitution went into
effect in 2010 with the civilian transition.72 Reports of
coercion and military intimidation, coupled with the disorder
that resulted from Cyclone Nargis, indicated that the
referendum was largely a sham.73
And then, without a stir, the government implemented
top-down, democratic reforms in the fall of 2011.
In
September, public pressure prompted President Thein Sein to

62. Id. at 257.
63. Williams, supra note 34, at 1666.
64. Id.
65. ZAN, supra note 18, at 257 (adding that 181 out of 392 elected
representatives had either been disqualified, forced to resign, died, detained, or
were in exile).
66. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 137–38.
67. Williams, supra note 34, at 1669.
68. Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104.
69. Williams, supra note 34, at 1669–70. See infra Part III.A.
70. Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104.
71. See id. (noting that the referendum experienced premarked ballot
papers, threats of physical violence, forced voting, and a low voter turnout and
that such allegations of corruption was “widespread”). “Despite reports of low
voter turnout, the government eventually announced that 98.12 percent of
eligible voters had voted, with the SPDC’s new constitution receiving an
overwhelming 92.48 percent of the vote.” Id.
72. See Mydans, supra note 3.
73. See Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104; Williams, supra note 34, at
1669.
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suspend a controversial dam partnership with China,
reasoning that the project was against “the aspirations and
wishes of the people.”74 In October, the government began
freeing political prisoners amid long-time pressure from its
foreign critics.75 The government abolished the practice of
direct media censorship,76 and legalized trade unions and the
right to strike.77 New and pending reforms continue to
attract attention,78 including the eventual dissolution of the
press censorship office,79 and the release of more political
prisoners.80 In December, the NLD re-registered as an official
party, and Suu Kyi has since announced her candidacy for a
parliamentary position.81 In a by-election in April 2012, the
NLD won forty-three of the forty-five contested parliamentary
seats, including a victory seat for Suu Kyi.82 She has since
been appointed to lead the “Rule of Law and Tranquility
Committee,” which is responsible for establishing a legal
74. Thomas Fuller, Myanmar Backs Down, Suspending Dam Project, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/
myanmar-suspends-construction-of-controversial-dam.html?_r=1.
75. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Begins to Release Some of its Political
Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/
world/asia/myanmar-begins-releasing-some-political-prisoners.html.
76. Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Government Abolishes Direct Media
Censorship, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2012, 1:14 AM), http://in.reuters.com/
article/2012/08/20/myanmarcensorshipidINL4E8JK35920120820.
77. Joseph Allchin, New Law Gives Burmese Right to Strike, DEMOCRATIC
VOICE OF BURMA (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.dvb.no/news/new-law-givesburmese-right-to-strike/18174.
78. See Jason Szep, Emboldened by Obama, Myanmar Maps Out Reforms,
REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2011, 8:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
11/19/us-myanmar-reformsidUSL3E7MJ05Q20111119.
79. Myanmar’s Censor Calls for Press Freedom, UPI.COM (Oct. 11, 2011,
6:10 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/11/Myanmars-censorcalls-for-press-freedom/UPI-89641318327800/ (reporting that the director of the
Press Scrutiny and Registration Department foresees that his department may
soon be disbanded as his country trends towards democracy).
80. Dean Nelson, Hillary Clinton Burma Visit Raises Hopes Political
Prisoners will be Released, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Dec. 2, 2011, 1:06 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8931107/Hilla
ry-Clinton-Burma-visit-raises-hopes-political-prisoners-will-be-released.html.
81. Aung San Suu Kyi Party Unveils Logo in Burma Politics Run, THE
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8950472/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-party-unveils-logo
-in-Myanmar-politics-run.html.
82. Peter Popham, Aung San Suu Kui Will Join Burma Parliament and
Hopes to Reform Constitution, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 20, 2012, 4:15 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/30/aung-san-suu-kyi-will-joinburma-parliament-and-hopes-to-reform-constitution.html.
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culture as the country continues to transition.83
The reforms have garnered positive international
attention for Burma. The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) approved Burma’s bid for the 2014
chairmanship.84
Burma held bilateral discussions with
India,85 Japan,86 and Indonesia87 in order to rekindle economic
and political support. Most radically, U.S. Secretary of State
Hilary Clinton met with Burmese leaders, including Suu Kyi,
to praise and assess the reforms; however, Secretary Clinton
stressed that more than a “rhetorical commitment to reform”
was necessary before lifting sanctions.88 Britain soon followed
with a similar meeting, encouraging the country to continue
democratic reforms.89
Many observers, however, have remained hesitant to
validate the sudden reforms.90 Intrastate violence between
83. Associated Press, Myanmar’s Suu Kyi to Chair Parliamentary
Committee, AP (Aug. 7, 2012, 5:18 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/myanmarssuu-kyi-chair-parliamentary-committee.
84. Asean Leaders Approve Burma Chairmanship Bid, BBC NEWS
ASIA(Nov. 17, 2011, 7:16 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15771531.
85. Chandrahas Choudhury, Can India Push Burma on the Road to
Liberty?, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-06-27/can-india-push-burma-on-the-road-to-liberty-.html.
86. The Mainichi, Japan Vows to Help Myanmar's Transition Toward
RIVERS
NETWORK
(Oct.
22,
2011),
Democracy,
BURMA
http://www.burmariversnetwork.org/news/11-news/729-japan-vows-to-help
myanmars-transition-toward-democracy.html.
87. Agence France-Presse, Indonesian Foreign Minister Meets Suu Kyi in
(Dec.
28,
2011),
http://www.google.com/
Myanmar,
GOOGLE
hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5iupK1UgON9uUkyFHvRQkBL5wPACQ?docId=C
NG.55799cfbd389f865660da24bb02616c9.411.
88. Interview by Kim Ghattas with Hilary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of
State,
in
Rangoon,
Burma
(Dec.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/ 12/178110.htm. As this Comment goes
to press, the Obama Administration has significantly lifted all of the economic
sanctions against Burma. See Sam Holmes & Celine Fernandez, Myanmar
Awaits Sanction-Lift Effect, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2012, 12:04 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044454920457802219312083375
4.html. See also Matthew Pennington, US Lifts Myanmar International
Lending Restriction, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:42 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121010/us-us-myanmar-sanctions/
(writing that President Obama has lifted the U.S. restriction against Burma’s
ability to lend from international financial institutions like the World Bank).
89. Jason Burke & Julian Borger, Aung San Suu Kyi Calls for Change as
Hague Makes Historic Visit to Burma, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/aung-san-suu-kyi-hague-burma.
90. See Kelly McParland, Burmese Generals Put on a Show of Democracy for
Audience of Skeptics, NAT’L POST (Canada) (Oct. 11, 2011, 11:45 AM),
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/10/11/burmese-generals-put-on-a-
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resistance groups and the national army is still a major
issue.91 In June 2012, communal violence between Buddhist
Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims prompted President Thein
Sein to announce the expulsion of the Rohingyas from Burma
as the only solution to the ethnic conflict.92 Even if the
government is given the benefit of the doubt, how does Burma
go about achieving a lasting democracy?
B. The Asian Human Rights Conundrum
In Asia, the contest between a state’s desire to maintain
stability and the citizens’ demand for greater individual
rights is a well-established issue.93
Governments,
particularly those of China, Singapore, Malaysia, and
Indonesia, have argued that human rights policies, including
political and civil liberties, are a matter of national
sovereignty and should not be subject to international
standards.94 Developing states have a legitimate concern
when it comes to stability. It would be hypocritical and
unproductive, however, to legitimize repeated violence and
suppression against dissidents in the name of stability. As a
result, human rights advocates believe that such intolerant
governments invoke the argument only to maintain tight
control over its people.

show-of-democracy-for-audience-of-skeptics/.
91. Saw Yan Naing, And Now the Ethnic Crisis, THE IRRAWADDY (Thai.)
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22297.
92. See ‘Campaign of Violence’ in Burma State-Rights Group, BBC NEWS
ASIA (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19074383.
See also Burma Blocks Opening of Office for Islamic Body OIC, BBC NEWS
ASIA (Oct. 15, 2012, 8:47 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19949414
(reporting on the government’s disallowance of an Islamic organization to
establish an office in Burma to assist local Muslims in the aftermath of the
Rakhine-Rohingya conflict). But see Myanmar President Urges Change of
Attitude Toward Muslim Minority, THE NATION (Thai.) (Oct. 22, 2012, 2:04 PM),
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Myanmar-president-urgeschange-of-attitude-toward--30192795.html.
The two preceding articles
represent the stark reality of minorities living in Burma and perhaps, the
beginning glimpses of a government thinking twice about its past as it tries to
move its country forward.
93. See Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1994).
94. Id. at 7–8.
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1. Asian Values
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
famously posed the Asian values theory. The theory states
that Western emphasis on individual rights has no place in
the Asian heritage.95 Claiming Confucian principles and
speaking on behalf of East Asian societies,96 Lee believes that
the Western expansion of individual rights is bad policy:97
“The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or
misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly
society.”98 Lee explained that “guns, drugs, violent crime,
vagrancy, [and] unbecoming behavior in public” are sources of
the American erosion of a well-ordered society.99 Without a
well-ordered society, no one can achieve maximum freedom.100
“This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a
natural state of contention and anarchy.”101
Lee compared the drug policies of the United States and
Singapore to underscore the difference. In the United States,
the government sends antinarcotic forces across the globe to
combat the source of the drugs.102 Instead, Lee directly
resolved the problem with a national law that gives an officer
95. See generally Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 109
(1994).
96. See id. at 113. See also Ghai, supra note 93, at 11–12 (noting a strong
Confucian element in a 1991 Singaporean white paper stating, “The concept of
government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do right for the
people, and who have the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than
the Western idea that a government should be given as limited powers as
possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven
otherwise.”). This is at clear odds with the American judicial standard of review
of particular governmental actions as “immediately suspect” subject to the
“most rigid scrutiny.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
97. See Zakaria, supra note 95, at 111.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The legal ramifications arising from certain individual behavior in
Singapore and the United States are indeed different. Compare You Can Cage
the Singer, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/17419873 (discussing how a Singaporean judge found a British journalist
“guilty of scandalizing the judiciary”), with Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207,
1220 (2011) (“As a nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”).
102. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 111. See also Henry Chu, U.S., China Agree
to Anti-Drug Pact / Cooperation Pledge Signed by McCaffrey During Beijing
Visit, SFGATE.COM (June 20, 2000, 4:00 AM), http://articles.sfgate.com/2000-0620/news/17651842_1_so-called-golden-triangle-countries-joint-ties-crime-ringsdealing-drugs.
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the discretion to search and test anyone the officer believes to
be under the influence of drugs.103 “In America if you did that
it would be an invasion of the individual’s rights and you
would be sued.”104
Lee also believes that moral decay is another result of
this sort of lawlessness: “Man needs a certain moral sense of
right and wrong.”105 Because individuals are allowed to do
whatever they want, “Westerners have abandoned an ethical
basis for society . . . .”106 In comparing the views between Lee
and Suu Kyi, Professor Myint Zan stated that:
[Suu Kyi] may not entirely disagree with Lee that, in
many countries of the West and especially the United
States “individualism” has in certain aspects become too
rampant and disturbing from the perspective of Asian
societies and that the assertion of rights of the society
with the attendant instillation of moral responsibility are
needed to redress this.107

Duties to the community are paramount in Asia, Lee
further noted. Lee admonished the West for improperly
assuming the responsibility to remedy social ills.108 In Asia,
the individual “is not pristine and separate. The family is
part of the extended family, and then friends and the wider
society. The ruler or the government does not try to provide
for a person what the family best provides.”109 At first blush,
Lee’s statement is seemingly odd because the Singaporean
government is in fact very imposing.110 However, the notion
of individual duty may iron out this apparent conflict. Lee
would argue that, unlike what is happening in the West,
individual duty provides support to the community,

103. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 112.
104. Id. While there is greater protection of individual rights in the United
States, those rights certainly are not absolute. See United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (validating a search without a warrant when it is a
“search incident to lawful arrest”).
105. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 112.
106. Id.
107. Myint Zan, Position of Power and Notions of Empowerment: Comparing
the Views of Lee Kuan Yew and Aung San Suu Kyi on Human Rights and
Democratic Governance, 2 NEWCASTLE L. REV. 49, 56 (1997).
108. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 113–14.
109. Id. at 113.
110. Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic
Values, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 189, 190 (1994) (describing Lee’s regulation of
individual action as “an Orwellian extreme of social engineering”).
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preventing social problems and precluding the need for the
state to intervene.111
2. The Bangkok Declaration
Notwithstanding criticism, Asian nations112 convened and
signed the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights113 in 1993
(hereinafter “Bangkok Declaration”), an attempt to validate
the cultural relativity of human rights.114 Forty Asian
nations115 agreed to memorialize the assertion that although
human rights are universal in nature, the policy of human
rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm setting, bearing in
mind the significance of national and regional particularities
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”116
The Bangkok Declaration stressed other notable features
that mirrored the defensive tone of the Asian values
discourse.
The delegates agreed to respect “national
sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in
internal affairs of the States.”117
The delegates also
recognized the right to development as a fundamental part of
human rights, while discouraging the use of “human rights as
a conditionality for extending development assistance.”118
Nor should human rights be used “as an instrument of
political pressure.”119 The delegates also agreed that the
principle of self-determination is limited to those under alien,
colonial, or foreign occupation, and is not extended to
“undermine the territorial integrity, national sovereignty,

111. See Zakaria, supra note 95, at 113 (describing the differences between
the West’s and Singapore’s response in dealing with single-parent families). See
also Ghai, supra note 93, at 12 (explaining that “[t]he cohesion of society as well
as the fulfillment of the individual is secured through a chain and hierarchy of
duties” in Asian values).
112. All Asian nations that convened at the Asian regional preparatory
meeting for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights signed the
document. Ghai, supra note 93, at 6.
113. Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World
Conference on Human Rights, March 29–April 2, 1993, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/ASRM/8 (April 7, 1993) [hereinafter Bangkok Declaration].
114. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 91.
115. Id.
116. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 113, at 5.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 4. See also infra Part I.B.3.
119. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 113, at 4.
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and political independence of States.”120
The Bangkok Declaration, however, was not the only
Asian perspective at the meeting. Dozens of Asian NGOs
endorsed an alternative view, believing that the agreement
was just another justification for the perpetuation of abuse in
their region.121 The NGOs believed that a faulty international
economic order—collusion amongst international aid
agencies, political elites, and multinational corporations—
played a role in abusing human rights.122 They also favored
an equitable distribution of resources and eradication of
poverty through empowerment of minorities.123 The NGO
views sound very similar to those of Suu Kyi who stressed:
The provision of basic material needs is not sufficient to
make minority groups and indigenous peoples feel they
are truly part of the greater national entity. For they
have to be confident that they too have an active role to
play in shaping the destiny of the state that demands
their allegiance.124

As later discussions of this Comment will show, Suu Kyi
advocates political integration of the Burmese people and a
system of legal recourse to ensure legitimacy in the
government, and stability for the country.
3. Right to Development
While many see Asian values as pretext for authoritarian
control,125 other Asian states have adopted an “economic
development first” argument to explain their lackluster
human rights record.126 They argue that democracy has no

120. Id. at 5.
121. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 13–14.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id.
124. Aung San Suu Kyi, Empowerment for a Culture of Peace and
Development, Address at the World Commission Culture and Development 7
(Nov. 21, 1994) (transcript available in the Cornell University Library).
125. See infra Part II.B.
126. Although the right-to-development argument finds a rationale not
entirely separate from the Asian values discourse, the rhetorical effect is
important with respect to various nations. Singapore may likely emphasize
Asian values more steadfastly as it has. While China, with weaker economic
conditions, may emphasize its right to development. Political scientist Mark
Thompson has argued that Germany articulated a similar argument against
democracy during its imperial history. See Mark R. Thompson, Whatever
Happened to “Asian Values?,” 12 J. DEMOCRACY 154, 158 (2001).
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place in an environment of poverty and thus that economic
development is the precondition to political rights
The theory implies that economic
development.127
development requires a restriction on human rights because
the government must have a seamless framework to remove
obstacles.128
In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Declaration on the Right to Development129 (hereinafter
“Development Declaration”). The Development Declaration
was seen by Western critics as a concession to human rights
abuses.130 The main force of the declaration emphasized that
“international co-operation is essential” in assisting
developing countries.131
The Development Declaration
vaguely describes the right to development as “an inalienable
human right.”132 But it is conceptually difficult to understand
what development really means or how such a right would be
exercised.133 Constitutional scholar Yash Ghai put it simply,
“the rich countries must provide economic assistance to the
poor countries, but must not question their human rights
situation.”134
The right-to-development argument implies that the
secret to economic success lies in an authoritarian political
system.135 Indeed, many Asian nations did prosper without a
democratic political structure.136 The role of the state in
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan played a key role in their

127. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 9. The Chinese argued, “to eat their fill and
dress warmly were the fundamental demands of the Chinese people who had
long suffered cold and hunger.” Id. at 8.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Declaration on the Right to Development, 97th plenary meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) [hereinafter Development Declaration].
130. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 10.
131. Development Declaration, supra note 129, at art. 4 § 2.
132. Id. at art. 1 § 1.
133. “[The] inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth
and resources” sounds more like the needs of the state, rather than of the
individual. Id. at art. 1 § 2.
134. Ghai, supra note 93, at 10.
135. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 156 (“This view led Singaporean
senior minister Lee Kuan Yew to warn Manila business leaders that their
country needed ‘discipline more than democracy.’ ” ).
136. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 149 (1999) (noting that
South Korea, Singapore and postreform China have experienced faster rates of
economic growth than less authoritarian ones like India, Costa Rica, and
Jamaica).

NG FINAL

284

6/24/2013 8:02 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:53

In contrast, Hong Kong’s success can be
economies.137
attributed to a mostly unregulated market. Democracy and
political freedoms were mostly irrelevant during its
development stage.138 Ghai raised the important distinction
that “it was the market which shaped the State in the West,
but it is the State which has shaped the market in Asia.”139
Professor Francis Fukuyama, on the other hand, doubted the
economic efficacy of authoritarian governments and remarked
“[w]hen such governments function well, as in the case of
Singapore and South Korea under military rule, they can
indeed be very effective at promoting rapid growth; but when
they function badly, like Brazil or Peru during the 1970’s,
their economies tend to perform much more poorly than
democracies.”140 Indeed, the Burmese government tried to
mimic the Indonesian “developmentalist dictatorship” to
further economic growth.141
Contrary to some antistate views of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the role of the state is in fact crucial at
the development stage, as the “East Asian Miracle”
suggests.142 Caution should be exercised when exposing
nascent economies to the well-known risks of full-fledged
capitalism.143 Even Adam Smith recommended a sort of
“interventionist logic” because the free market and individual
pursuit of private gains have dire consequences,144 as
evidenced by the 1997 Asian Crisis.145
137. See Francis Fukuyama, Asian Values and the Asian Crisis, 105
COMMENT. MAG. 23, 24 (1998).
138. Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law and Capitalism: Reflections on the Basic
Law, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997, ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 343, 344
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1993).
139. Ghai, supra note 93, at 32.
140. Fukuyama, supra note 137, at 24. See also SEN, supra note 136, at 15
(“[C]omprehensive intercountry comparisons have not provided any
confirmation of this thesis, and there is little evidence that authoritarian
politics actually helps economic growth.”).
141. Thompson, supra note 126, at 156.
142. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 91
(2002). The “East Asian Miracle” is known as the remarkable economic rise of
particular East Asian states in the last three decades of the twentieth century.
Id. at 90.
143. See SEN, supra note 136, at 124 (“Even Adam Smith . . . did not hesitate
to investigate economic circumstances in which particular restrictions may be
sensibly proposed, or economic fields in which nonmarket institutions would be
badly needed to supplement what the markets can do.”).
144. Id. at 124–25.
145. See STIGLITZ, supra note 142, at 18.
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Asian governments have also been the pioneering
example of promoting human development, the process of
expanding education, health and other conditions of human
life.146 Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen notes that the developed
Asian states established high literacy rates through
expansion of education and reduced mortality rates through
health care before seeing a decline in poverty.147 Prime
Minister Lee stated, “If you have a culture that doesn’t place
much value in learning and scholarship and hard work and
thrift and deferment of present enjoyment for future gain, the
going will be much slower.”148 As Burma continues its path of
reform, the government must reevaluate the proper role of
the state—where it should intervene and where it should not.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Asian Values Theory and Its Legitimacy
Lee Kuan Yew and other Asian leaders,149 by promoting
communitarianism
over
individualism,
maintained
authoritarian policies that have resulted in an alarming
suppression of civil liberties. In his defense, Lee stated
emphatically, “It is not my business to tell people what’s
wrong with their system. It is my business to tell people not
to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it
will not work.”150 In his view, the suppression of civil liberties
is a necessary condition to Singapore’s stability.
In support of Lee’s contention, the West had hundreds of
years to groom democracy and capitalism. This was done on
a trial and error basis.151 Along the way, the United States
146. See SEN, supra note 136, at 41.
147. Id. at 150.
148. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 116–17.
149. See Fukuyama, supra note 137, at 23 (attributing the subject of Asian
values to Lee Kuan Yew and former Prime Minster Mahathir Mohamad of
Malaysia); Kishore Mahbubani, The Dangers of Decadence, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 10
(1993); Thompson, supra note 126, at 155–56, 163 (noting that Indonesia’s
Suharto was the “leading regional advocate” of “Asian values as a doctrine of
developmentalism” and that pro-Beijing Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa
“attempted to use ‘Asian values’ against democracy” upon Hong Kong’s return
to China in 1997).
150. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 110.
151. The following are famous American Supreme Court decisions that
reflect the changing norms in U.S. society: Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954) (holding that the “separate but equal” principle with regard to race
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and Europe had their own brushes with human rights abuses.
One must only look to slavery, the treatment of Native
Americans, colonialism, and women’s rights to see how the
West has evolved.152 And while such abuses faced opposition
at the time, those actions were condoned by government
policy, only to be reversed through a combination of
democratic vehicles and an eventual shift in popular
opinion.153 The West’s criticism of human rights abuses is a
product, at least in part, of norms developed over the
millennia.
It is safe to say that a government’s ability to recognize
community interests and individual interests most likely rest
on a continuum.154 There may, however, exist a subtle but
notable distinction between Western individualism and Asian
group consciousness, at least from a historical standpoint.155
Pye stated, “it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of
both individual freedom and society’s needs, and to recognize
that Westerners are likely to be more sensitive to the first
issue and Asians to the second.”156 The weight of either
communitarianism or individualism cannot be measured in
absolutes.
Perhaps long ago, Asian nations favored
has no place in public education for children); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 223 (1945) (validating the American government’s internment camps
of Japanese Americans during World War II); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
543 (1896) (holding that the segregation of black and white Americans “do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other”), overruled by
Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Stephen Breyer,
“For Their Own Good,” The Cherokees, the Supreme Court and the Early History
of American Conscience, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/their-own-good.
152. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 14 (“There is no reason why contemporary
concerns and fads in the West should define the parameters of international
discourse in, and aspirations, of human rights.”).
153. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 22 (2010) (In
responding to a question posed, “[w]hy do Americans do what the courts say?”
Breyer writes, “[f]ollowing the law is a matter of custom, of habit, of widely
shared understandings as to how those in government and members of the
public should, and will, act when faced with a court decision they strongly
dislike.”).
154. See PYE, supra note 9, at 26.
155. Id. at 352 n.38 (“The distinction between Western individualism and
Asian group consciousness has been a dominant theme in Sir George Sansom’s
interpretation of Japan, John K. Fairbank’s description of China, Louis
Dumont’s work on India, and the work of such general theorists as Michael
Polyani, Sir Thomas Maine, and of course both Max Weber and Karl Marx.”).
156. Id. at 27.
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communitarianism, but today a trend toward individualism
may better serve the needs of the people.157 In writing about
her own country, Suu Kyi wrote, “[i]t was natural that a
people who have suffered much from the consequences of bad
government should be preoccupied with theories of good
government.”158 It is for this very reason that the former
Burmese Chairman U Ne Win decided to hold multiparty
elections in 1990.159
B. Asian Values Theory and Its Criticism
Critics have pointed out several flaws with the Asian
values theory, beginning with its religious scope.160 To
confine the political governance theory to a single philosophy
(Confucianism) ignores the diversity of religions and
philosophies in Asia:161 Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia,
Buddhism in China and Burma, and Christianity in Korea
and the Philippines. Even among these religious traditions,
one can find sources of liberal democracy. For the purposes of
this Comment, the discussion will be limited to specific
Buddhist tenets and how Suu Kyi has relied on them as her
foundation for Burma’s realization of democracy.162
From absolute monarchy to socialism, the Burmese have
always associated their way of life with Buddhism.163 During
the Burmese monarchy, a king had the duty to rule according
to moral teachings revealed in the Dhamma.164 The myth of
Mahasammata described a Hobbesian account of men, “in a
157. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 21 (“Societies are constantly changing, and
with economical and social changes, there are also changes in the perception of
what is important and valuable to a community or a group.”).
158. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 168.
159. See ZAN, supra note 18, at 251 (writing that Ne Win said, “recent events
had indicated a lack of confidence in the Government [sic],” and that he needed
to know whether this view was shared by a “majority or minority”).
160. See generally Kim, supra note 110; Ghai, supra note 93, at 7;
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 139 (“[P]romotion of Buddhism during times of
political crisis is a long-standing cultural tradition in Burmese politics, dating
back to the eleventh-century kingdom of Pagan: ‘Where a government has faced
erosion of political legitimacy, whether it be Anawratha, U Nu, or Ne Win, it
returns to Buddhism.’ ” ). Asian NGOs also attacked the Asian values theory at
the Vienna World Conference on human rights. See supra Part I.B.2.
161. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 6.
162. Many scholars have pointed to several other religious traditions to
undermine Lee’s argument. See generally Kim, supra note 110, at 191–92.
163. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 139.
164. Id. at 140.
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state of want,” and their need for a social contract with an
elected sovereign in exchange for protection.165 Suu Kyi
disputes suggestions that Buddhist myths about kings
reinforce personalized forms of authority that are antithetical
to the modern state, writing that “because Mahasammata
was chosen by popular consent and required to govern in
accordance with just laws, the concept of government elective
and sub lege is not alien to traditional Burmese thought.”166
Burmese kings were morally bound to abide by ten moral
precepts (also known as the Ten Duties): “almsgiving,
observance of Buddhist precepts, liberality, rectitude,
gentleness, self-restriction, control of anger, avoidance of the
use of violence in his relationship with the people or
avoidance of maltreatment of the people, forbearance, and
‘non-opposition’ against the people’s will.”167
Suu Kyi
frequently references the last precept to reinforce her belief in
Burma’s democratic potential.
“The real duty of nonopposition is a reminder that the legitimacy of government is
founded on the consent of the people, who may withdraw
their mandate at any time if they lose confidence in the
ability of the ruler to serve their best interests.”168
Aside from religious limitations, critics also find the
Asian values rhetoric both self-serving and hypocritical.
Authoritarian leaders have crushed whole communities in the
name of “state stability:”169 China and the Tibetans;170 Burma
and the Karen, Kachin, Shan, and Rohingya communities;171
and Indonesia and the communists.172 Though its actions
have not been as wide scale as its neighbors, Singapore has
165. Id.
166. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 170.
167. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 142.
168. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 173.
169. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 17 (“Governments have destroyed many
communities in the name of development or State stability, and the consistent
refusal of most of them to recognise that there are indigenous peoples among
their population . . . is but a demonstration of their lack of commitment to the
real community.”).
170. Edward Wong, Study Points to Heavy-Handed Repression of Tibetan
Area in China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/13/world/asia/study-points-to-heavy-handed-repression-of-tibetan-areain-china.html?ref=edwardwong&_r=0.
171. See Naing, supra note 91; see supra text accompanying note 92.
172. Marilyn Berger, Suharto Dies at 86, Indonesian Dictator Brought Order
and Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
01/28/world/asia/28suharto.html?pagewanted=all.
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reportedly taped and doctored confessions extracted from
activists under coercion and presented those confessions to
national television as proof of guilt.173 Often falsely equating
the “community” with the “state,”174 autocratic regimes have
claimed that they directly advance national stability by
preventing secession and disunity.175 Burma thus repealed
the right to secession from its 1947 Constitution176 and the
2008 Constitution expressly prohibits such a right.177
Another criticism leveled against the Asian values theory
is that its characterization of “excessive individualism” in the
West is overbroad. The United States does provide expansive
individual rights in areas ranging from speech to gun
ownership, especially when compared to its Asian
counterparts, but those rights are not absolute. For example,
the right to free speech is evidence against Lee’s
characterization of the West.
Americans do not enjoy
protection when their expression involves obscenity, fighting
words, or incitement to violence.178 Furthermore, individual
states can prescribe their own standards for regulating
libel.179 Child pornography, though it can be viewed as
individual expression, is categorically unprotected.180
173. Ghai, supra note 93, at 9.
174. Id. at 17.
175. Regarding its preventive detention of activists, Singapore’s Minister of
Home Affairs responded, “[i]n our short history, Singapore has repeatedly
encountered subversive threats from within and without. . . . To combat these
threats to the nation, the usual procedures of court trials . . . have proved totally
inadequate. . . . Preventive detention is not a blemish marring our record; it is a
necessary power underpinning our freedom.” Id. at 9.
176. See 1947 CONST., supra note 37, at ch. 10, § 201 (“[E]very State shall
have the right to secede from the Union in accordance with the conditions
hereinafter prescribed.”).
177. MYAN. CONST., supra note 1, at ch. 1, § 10 (“No part of the territory
constituted in the Union such as Regions, States, Union Territories and SelfAdministered Areas shall ever secede from the Union.”).
178. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining the standards of
what constitutes obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(distinguishing between mere advocacy and advocacy that “is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action,” the latter being constitutionally unprotected); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that “fighting words” are “those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace”).
179. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974).
180. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“[T]he distribution
network for pornography must be closed if the production of material which
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.”).
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Similarly, an individual’s expression through public nudity
has also been invalidated.181 Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has routinely validated the government’s
regulation of an individual’s free speech rights on public
grounds under “time, place and manner” restrictions.182 Lee’s
description of the Western individual’s right to “unbecoming
behavior” in the public space is far from the truth.183 By
ignoring the actual state of rights throughout the world, the
cultural arguments of Asian values have conveniently served
to suppress opposition in countries like Burma.184
C. Rights vs. Duties
While many have addressed the defensive tone of Asian
values, there may nonetheless be some subtle merit in the
distinction between the Western emphasis of rights and the
Asian notion of duties. In the West, the evolution of rights
correlated strongly with the evolution of the market
economy.185 Duties, on the other hand, may be a product of
Asian socialization, a nuanced norm dictated by the Asian
181. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (holding that the
prohibition of public nudity in public places targets secondary effects of the
conduct such as public health, safety and welfare).
182. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(ruling that the prohibition against sleeping overnight, even as a form of
protest, in a designated park area was not unconstitutional); Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 795 (1984) (ruling that the
prohibition of hanging signs over certain public property is a “reasonable
regulation affecting the time, place, and manner of expression” because it
protects utility workers and eliminates traffic hazards).
183. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
184. Other American constitutional rights also carry restrictions. The right
to bear arms does not mean that an individual can carry a handgun for any
purpose.
See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
Additionally, an individual cannot practice her religion if her practice runs
contrary to other laws. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 878–79 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
that the State is free to regulate.”). With respect to criminal procedure, an
individual can avail herself of Fourth Amendment protection against a
warrantless search only if she can demonstrate 1) that she has an actual
subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) that society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27–28
(2001) (applying Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967)).
185. Ghai has provided both a logical and historical connection between
democracy and the market, and both connections explain the foundation of
rights in Western society. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 31.
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emphasis on hierarchy and chain of command.186
From both a historical and logical standpoint, the West’s
emphasis on individual rights is inherent in the market
economy and its evolution. Private property ownership
necessitates decentralization and individual decision making
through freedom of choice.187 Judicially cognizable rights
ensure predictability and legal security of such autonomous
decisions.188 Similarly, the departure from traditional forms
of economic tools such as labor (from “status” to “contract”)
required the utility of rights and democratic vehicles.189 Sen
stated, “conceptualization of economic needs depends
crucially on open public debates and discussions, the
guaranteeing of which requires insistence on basic political
liberty and civil rights.”190
The United States’ Occupy
movement is an example of the democratic response to
capitalist forces.191
In Asia, however, it is believed that individual duties
have a higher priority. While it is not clear what the precise
duties are and where they come from, it is at least clear from
Lee’s criticism of American excess that such duties are
related to personal responsibility.192 If Lee argued correctly
that the “liberal, intellectual tradition” heedlessly views that
“everybody would be better off if they were allowed to do their
own thing,”193 then self-restraint is a better fit in the Asian
tradition. It could be that duty is intrinsically tied to the
“Asian orientation toward the group . . . [that] elevates tests
of loyalty and commitment . . . while downplaying the
legitimacy of using politics to advance special interests.”194 To
understand Asian values against the Western liberal,
intellectual tradition, the notion of rights is necessarily
individual centric and the notion of duties is necessarily
community centric.

186. Id. at 12.
187. See id. at 31.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. SEN, supra note 136, at 148.
191. Chrystia Freeland, Inequality, but Without the Villains, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/us/09iht-letter09.html.
192. See Zakaria, supra note 95, at 112.
193. Id.
194. PYE, supra note 9, at 27.
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It must necessarily follow that the notion of duties must
also be extended to the state. Like Suu Kyi, who has stressed
the kingly duty to rule by the consent of the people, Ghai has
also noted that “the notion of duty can be truly
revolutionary.”195 Furthermore, Pye pointed out that the
concept of paternalism does not have the stigma in Asia as it
does in the West.196 “In most Asian cultures leaders are
expected to be nurturing, benevolent, kind, sympathetic
figures who inspire commitment and dedication.”197
While there is no clear answer to the priority of rights or
duties, it is at least clear that in repressive regimes like
Burma, there is both a deprivation of rights on the one hand,
and a neglect of government duty on the other.198 Ghai
cautioned that in practice, however, the notion of duties
creates social, economic, and political subordination,199
particularly in the hands of an intolerant government. “The
West has, to some extent, separated civil society from the
State, creating a ‘neutral’ public area and space for
communities”200 where individuals can exercise their political
rights.
In Asia, the tendency has been towards a
“convergence of the two, regarded perhaps as necessary for
the legitimacy of the State but ultimately destructive of the
community.”201
D. Feasibility of the Right-to-Development Argument
From an economic historical perspective, the West and
the East share similar paths. Like many Asian nations
during their developmental periods,202 the United States and
Japan engaged in similar protectionist economic strategies
during the beginning days of capitalist development.203 It was
195. Ghai, supra note 93, at 19.
196. PYE, supra note 9, at 27.
197. Id. at 27–28.
198. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 176 (“Democracy acknowledges the right to
differ as well as the duty to settle differences peacefully.”).
199. Ghai, supra note 93, at 19.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citation omitted).
202. See STIGLITZ, supra note 142, at 91 (remarking that the East Asian
Miracle became successful because they had not followed the dictates of the
Washington Consensus that demanded “minimalist roles” of the government).
203. See id. at 16 (“[M]ost of the advanced industrialist countries—including
the United States and Japan—had built up their economies by wisely and
selectively protecting some of their industries until they were strong enough to
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not until the United States reached the pinnacle of its
economic prosperity during post–World War II that the
American government was finally responding to the
disenfranchisement of millions of African-Americans at home.
Was the United States exercising its right to development? I
would respond with a resounding “no.” Instead, it is more
likely that economic modernization and democracy develop
along a continuum, overlapping sometimes as a country
responds to various social and historical forces. Neither
needs to be a precondition of the other.
The sequencing of economic and political rights is indeed
problematic.
Sen has urged the recognition of
“interconnections [that exist] between political freedoms and
the understanding and fulfillment of economic needs.”204 A
society requires a democratic framework first before they can
decide basic needs.205 While some Asian states have achieved
economic success without democracy, there is no reason to
believe that a country needs to restrict political freedoms in
order to achieve economic modernity.206 The democratic
movements in South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan serve to counter certain governments’ shortsighted
belief that their people care more about economic livelihood
than political participation.207
Burma clearly saw the
symbiotic relationship between economic development and
political rights in 2007 when Buddhist monks took to the
streets after a drastic rise in fuel prices.208
III. BURMA’S NEW FUTURE
While Burma has undergone reforms at an
unprecedented rate, the country faces a long journey ahead
before it can achieve any recognizable form of democracy.
Whether Burma can politically reform to achieve a level of
confidence, sustainability, and international recognition is
the million-dollar question. Burma’s potential for success can
be predicted by the histories of its Asian neighbors—what has
worked and what has not worked. Suu Kyi’s influential role
compete with foreign companies.”).
204. SEN, supra note 136, at 147.
205. Ghai, supra note 93, at 30.
206. See SEN, supra note 136, at 150.
207. Id. at 151.
208. See Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104.
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in Burmese politics may precipitate the movement and usher
in a new era for one of Asia’s most troubled nations.
A. Constitution of 2008
The tug-of-war between rights and duties is apparent in
the 2008 Constitution. With respect to individual rights,
Burma’s latest constitution remains suspiciously vague.
Chapter eight, entitled “Citizen, Fundamental Rights and
Duties of the Citizens,” codifies both an equal protection and
a due process clause.209 However, both of these fundamental
rights are subject to suspension upon a state of emergency.210
Moreover, while the constitution provides the right to practice
political liberties such as free exercise of religion, free speech,
and right to association, these rights cannot be exercised
“contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence
of law and order, community peace and tranquility or public
order and morality.”211 An individual also has the duty to
“Necessary law” shall be
preserve community peace.212
enacted to effectuate “citizens’ freedoms, rights, benefits,
responsibility and restrictions . . . .”213 This last provision is
strikingly similar to the Asian values argument that stresses
community stability at the expense of individual rights. The
relaxation or even elimination of the present restrictions
against these individual rights must occur in order to
transition Burma into a new state.
Considering Burma’s history, the most troubling aspect
of the 2008 Constitution is the role of the military. The
military, acting on any perceived threat to national security,
can independently reverse the new reforms. As stated in the
preamble, the country’s principle objectives are defensive in
nature, specifically “non-disintegration of the Union,”

209. Burma’s equal protection clause states, “The Union shall guarantee any
person to enjoy equal rights before the law and shall equally provide legal
protection.” MYAN. CONST., supra note 1, at ch. 8, § 347. The due process
clause states, “Except in the following situations and time, no citizen shall be
denied redress by due process of law for grievances entitled under law: (a) in
time of foreign invasion; (b) in time of insurrection; (c) in time of emergency.”
Id. at ch. 8, § 381.
210. Id. at ch. 8, § 420, ch. 11, § 414(b).
211. Id. at ch. 8, § 354.
212. Id. at ch. 1, § 21(c) (“Every citizen is responsible for public peace and
tranquility and prevalence of law and order.”).
213. Id. at ch. 1, § 21(d).
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“[n]ational solidarity,” and “perpetuation of sovereignty.”214
The military is “mainly responsible” for maintaining these
objectives,215 and thus responsible for upholding the
constitution.
Not only does it have express authority from the
constitution to act, the military is also guaranteed seats in
both the national216 and local legislatures.217 A state of
emergency allows the military to assume all legislative,
executive, and judicial powers.218 Any amendment affecting
individual rights or the organization of the government
requires an initial approval of seventy-five percent of the
national legislature.219 Because the military dominates so
many seats, it would be impossible to obtain constitutional
muster without at least minimal military support.
While it is not likely to happen soon, a constitutional
amendment in Burma is possible.
Although military
entrenchment in Burma’s constitutional procedure is
undeniable, it is possible that Burma’s military generals are
in agreement with the current movement for change. The old
military guard is no longer in power, and the current generals
are all much younger men.220 Suu Kyi has indicated that she
finds President Thein Sein, a former military general, to be
“an honest man . . . a man capable of taking risks if he thinks
they are worth taking.”221 The power transitions in the
military appear to favor the potential for real change in
214. Id. at Preamble.
215. Id. at ch. 1, § 20(e).
216. In Burma’s bicameral legislature, the military is guaranteed 110 seats
in the Pyithu Hluttaw, an assembly similar to the American Congress whose
members are based on population. Id. at ch. 4, § 109. The Amyotha Hluttaw,
similar to the American Senate based on equal representation from the
Burmese states and regions, reserves fifty-six seats for the military. Id. at ch. 4,
§ 141.
217. The military is guaranteed an equal number of seats as one-third of the
non-military representatives of the region and state legislatures. Id. at ch. 4,
§ 161(d). Burma is comprised of seven states, seven regions, and territories
called the “Union territories.” MYAN. CONST., supra note 1, at ch. 2, § 49.
218. Id. at ch. 11, §§ 413(b), 419.
219. Id. at ch. 12, § 436(a).
220. Nirupama Subramanian, Towards Reconciliation in Myanmar, THE
HINDU
(Nov.
3,
2011),
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/
article2592036.ece (calling the military generals “junior partners in
government” today).
221. Jason Burke, Aung San Suu Kyi’s Party Could Rule Burma One Day,
Says Presidential Aide, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jan. 5, 2012, 7:45 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/aung-san-suu-kyi-burma.
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Burma.
B. Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Future Civil Society
The development of civil society, which is at a historical
low in Burma,222 is necessary to provide lasting change. As
the Burmese government begins to loosen up restrictions on
political liberties, it is inevitable that the people will seize the
opportunity to put forth their grievances. Indeed, since the
1990 election, interest groups began appearing throughout
the Burmese political scene, some of which championed
alternative constitutions.223 While ethnic violence persists,
the government recently established a cease-fire agreement
with the Shan state, a major ethnic minority.224 The Burmese
people are more optimistic about the civilian government,
marveling at their ability to speak openly about their political
views.225
Suu Kyi remains the beacon of hope for so many
Burmese.
The Burmese government would do well to
seriously consider her ideas. Her involvement with the
government and the reform process is extremely visible. The
positions Suu Kyi has taken in the last twenty years may
provide hints as to how she plans on influencing the current
government.
First and foremost, Suu Kyi has been a
vociferous critic of the cultural argument advanced by Lee
and his supporters, and has directly addressed the arguments
made in this Comment.226
She accuses authoritarian
governments of wrongly considering themselves better suited
to enjoy more rights and privileges than the governments of
democratic countries.
This, Suu Kyi argues, leads the
authoritarian government to assume “so wide a gulf between
the government and the people that they have to be judged by
222. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 198.
223. See Williams, supra note 34, at 1673.
224. Agence France-Presse, Burma Reaches Ceasefire with Major Rebel
Group, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2011, 11: 21 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/201112-03/burma-ceasefire-with-major-rebel-group/3711274.
225. Myo Thein & Dean Nelson, Burmese Dare to Believe Dash to Democracy
Will Set Them Free, THE VANCOUVER SUN (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Burmese+dare+believe+dash+democracy+
will+them+free/5555477/story.html.
226. See Suu Kyi, supra note 124, at 2 (“In the light of such arguments
culture and development need to be carefully examined and defined that they
may not be used, or rather, misused to block the aspirations of peoples for
democratic institutions and human rights.”).
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different norms.”227
Second, Suu Kyi has challenged the right-to-development
argument. She believes that the key to unlocking human
potential cannot be limited to economic concerns; such
concerns are necessarily related to different value systems
understood by the privileged and unprivileged.
The differing views ultimately reflect differences in how
the valuation of the various components of social and national
unity are made; how such basic concepts as poverty, progress,
culture, freedom, democracy, and human rights are defined
and, of crucial importance, who has the power to determine
such values and definitions.228
For a poor person, the alleviation of her status is not
simply to make more money, but to also be involved in the
decision-making process that allows her to shape her present
and future destiny in her country.229 For Suu Kyi, the
sequencing of economic rights and political rights is simply
not acceptable.
Third, Suu Kyi has always supported Western sanctions
against her country,230 suggesting that the Burmese need
more than just an economic solution.231 She has said, “It is
assumed that economic measures can resolve all the problems
facing their countries.”232 Historian Thant Myint-U ardently
disagrees, believing that the sanctions have been extremely
counterproductive to the democratic movement, slowing “the
emergence of the sort of independent middle class on which
any sustainable democratic transition will depend.”233 The
problem with receiving aid conditioned on human rights is
227. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 175.
228. Suu Kyi, supra note 124, at 3.
229. Id. at 3–4. This view goes against a position that Pye has taken when
comparing the American and Asian notions of power: “In most of Asia . . . to
have power was to be spared the chore of decision-making . . . Making decisions
means taking risks, while security lies in having no choices to make.” PYE,
supra note 9, at 21–22.
230. Aung San Suu Kyi Calls for Sanctions on Burma to Remain, THE
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Feb. 8, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news
/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8310214/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-calls-forsanctionson-Burma-to-remain.html.
231. See Suu Kyi, supra note 124, at 3 (“[T]he Market Economy, not merely
adorned with capital letters but seen in an almost mystic haze, is increasingly
regarded by many governments as the quick and certain way to material
prosperity.”).
232. See id.
233. See Subramanian, supra note 220.
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that there is no universal standard.234 This confrontation
between national sovereignty and the international
community leaves millions in the dark. It is the absence of
Western aid in Burma, as well as a looming Chinese
influence, that some believe is the motivation for reform.235
Lastly, Suu Kyi is devoted to transitioning Burma into a
liberal democracy. Long ago she wrote, “[a]t its most basic
and intermediate level, liberal democracy would mean in
institutional terms a representative government appointed
for a constitutionally limited term through free and fair
elections.”236
While Westerners may take democratic
institutions for granted, for a country like Burma that has
been historically blemished by brutality, “democracy, like
liberty, justice and other social and political rights, is not
‘given,’ it is earned through courage, resolution and
sacrifice.”237
Suu Kyi has also advocated a federalist
structure for increased sovereignty and protection of ethnicdominated states.238 Recently tasked with establishing a rule
of law in Burma,239 Suu Kyi has a long road ahead to revamp
Burmese society, but fortunately has a wealth of ideas ready
for her people that she has long yearned to share.
CONCLUSION
Is Aung San Suu Kyi too idealistic and Singapore’s Lee
Kuan Yew too pragmatic? Historian Myint Zan reminisced a
remark by one of his students who said, “Aung San Suu Kyi is
idealistic, she has never been in political power. Lee Kuan

234. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 25. Ghai wrote:
[p]overty is a great cause of the denial of human rights. The
international system refuses to accept this reality—for largely political
reasons. It refuses to acknowledge that poverty destroys human
dignity; and without human dignity there can be no human rights; or
indeed the capacity to challenge the system of oppression.
Id. at 23. Certainly Suu Kyi would agree with this statement, but it is unclear
whether the two would reach the same agreement on the issue of Western
sanctions against Burma.
235. See Bertil Lintner, China Behind Myanmar’s Course Shift, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE
(Oct.
19,
2011),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_
Asia/MJ19Ae03.html.
236. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 169.
237. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
238. Ba Kaung, Suu Kyi Asks for Federalism Theses, THE IRRAWADDY (Thai.)
(May 12, 2011), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21287.
239. See Associated Press, supra note 83.
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Yew is a seasoned politician. I would take Lee any time over
Aung San Suu Kyi.”240 Perhaps the answer is not so clear cut.
While Lee’s pragmatism certainly cannot be denied
considering the rapid prosperity he brought to his country,
Singapore embarked on a different path following its
independence241 from Britain.242 Burma’s path was mired by
isolationism and repression. It is because of this experience
that Suu Kyi believes democracy “is not given” but must be
“earned.”243 When faced with Lee’s communitarian approach
and the West’s individualism, Suu Kyi may very well
advocate a “Middle Way,” a Buddhist approach to avoid both
extremes.244 The various paths of its Asian neighbors will be
an invaluable source for Burma in the coming years.
Avoiding the failures and learning the successes of the past
will aid Burma, as it desires to move forward to achieve a
lasting democracy.

240. Zan, supra note 107, at 66.
241. Technically, Singapore seceded from Malaysia. U.S. Cent. Intelligence
Agency, East & Southeast Asia: Singapore, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html. (last
updated Oct. 16, 2012).
242. Inquiring what was the difference between the Malaysian and Burmese
path from independence, Myint Zan wrote, “ ‘history [has] been less kind’ to
Burma than, say Malaysia and other countries which at least compared to
Burma has accountable representative governments[.]” ZAN, supra note 18, at
225.
243. See SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 176.
244. Zan, supra note 107, at 63.

